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Peter Reuter1 
 
This paper is intended to provide the basis for a discussion of policy options in 
dealing with new psychoactive substances that show signs of popularity and of 
harmfulness within a wider project being undertaken by the UK Drug Policy 
Commission and Demos, the outcomes of which are presented in Taking Drugs 
Seriously: a Demos and UK Drug Policy Commission report on legal highs (Birdwell et 
al., 2011). 
The review considers the international context, current approaches to tackling new 
drugs with a main focus on the USA and Europe, and examines four specific 
examples of new drugs: BZP, Spice, mephedrone and naphyrone. It also looks at the 
possible learning from other regulatory frameworks, those for foodstuffs and for 
alcohol and tobacco. 
When these drugs come to public attention, very little is known about the possible 
harms to users or whether they are complements or substitutes for other dangerous 
intoxicants.  Literally nothing is known about the harms that might be generated by 
an illicit market if the drug were prohibited.  The paper highlights the dilemmas 
associated with making regulatory decisions with such limited information. In recent 
years, great attention has been given to the “precautionary principle” as a guideline 
for policy making under uncertainty. However the complication here is that giving 
deference to only the possible harms faced by the individual user ignores the more 
subtle, but still real, harms that arise from the decision to prohibit. No consideration 
is currently given to any of the perceived benefits of use, which must play a part in 
an individual’s decision to use drugs. However, any kind of implicit legalization also 
may have unintended consequences, such as encouraging greater use. 
The report concludes that there is considerable unease with the existing system for 
making decisions about newly emerging psychoactive substances. Of fundamental 
concern is the fact that there is an overriding bias in the decision-making process 
towards the prohibition of new psychoactive substances, but achieving a more 
balanced set of regulatory decisions is a major task. The existing system has worked 
well in the sense that no major problem has emerged from a decision to allow into 
commerce a drug that turns out to be dangerous, the burden of proof for creating an 
alternative system is thus a heavy one. A research effort to improve understanding 
of the substitution effects of new entities, as well as an examination of how 
prohibition of these entities creates market harms, would go a long way toward 
clarifying the issues. 
 
                                           
1 School of Public Policy and Department of Criminology, University of Maryland.  Alexa Briscoe provided 
excellent research assistance.  I have also benefited greatly from access to two unpublished papers by 
Jonathan Caulkins and Carolyn Coulson.  Brendan Hughes was very helpful in discussing EU procedures.  
The final version benefited from Allison Ritter’s extremely useful review. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is easy to think of the drug problem as defined by a few substances that have 
troubled societies for decades, if not centuries.  Heroin, still regarded as the drug 
causing the greatest harm in aggregate, has been part of the consciousness of most 
Western societies for a century.  For the United Kingdom heroin has been a serious 
health and crime problem for at least the last forty years.  Cocaine, now comparably 
important, has emerged only in the last decade in the UK as a large-scale problem 
but it had been well known through its ravages in the US for twenty years before 
that. 
 
However at the edges of the problem, there have emerged new psychoactive 
substances, not covered by the existing system of drug-specific regulations and 
prohibitions; two examples that have been prominent recently are mephedrone and 
Spice. Many, but not all, of these substances are the creation of entrepreneurial 
chemists.  Some are natural substances, for which new and more dangerous modes 
of ingestion have been developed or whose intoxicating properties have not 
previously been understood.  Yet others are manufactured substances for which also 
new uses as intoxicants have been found. A wide range of terms have been used to 
describe such substances. These include legal highs, synthetics, research chemicals, 
designer drugs and party drugs, all of which are within the scope of this review.  
 
The problem is not an entirely new one.  Late 20th century chemistry was advanced 
enough to produce a rapid flow of new psychoactive drugs that found their niches in 
recreational markets (e.g. ketamine and GHB).  Alexander Shulgin, a prominent 
chemist in the development of new psychedelics in the United States, notes that 
there were only two such substances in 1900 (marijuana, mescalin), 20 by 1950 and 
over 200 by 2000 (quoted in Kau 2008, pp.1079-1080).  Governments have 
struggled throughout the last century with how to respond to these new entities 
about whose effects they were poorly informed, generally prohibiting them for 
precautionary reasons.  The number of drugs on the list banned by international 
conventions has risen sharply, very much as Shulgin sketched for psychedelics.  
When the Single Convention passed in 1961 there were 85 prohibited drugs, whereas 
by 1995 there were 282 (Babor et al., 2010).  What is striking is how narrow and/or 
ephemeral are the niches that these new drugs have so far occupied in the 
recreational market.  Even LSD, perhaps the most venerable of them, has almost 
disappeared in the US, after 40 years, following a major enforcement success in the 
year 2000 (Grimm, 2009).2 Others simply lose popularity, either because that 
particular experience is unattractive to a new generation or because of fears about 
adverse effects, usually reflecting actual experience of recreational users rather than 
government announcements3. 
                                           
2 In 1999 8.1% of high school seniors reported use of LSD in the previous month; that figure 
was 1.6% in 2009. http://monitoringthefuture.org/data/09data/pr09t2.pdf.   
3 For example, in 1996 4.0% of US high school reported use of PCP (phencyclidine) in the 
previous 12 months.  That figure fell steadily over the next 13 years; by 2009 it had fallen by 
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Though the problem itself is demonstrably not new, it is easy to identify factors that 
may make it more acute today:  the growing speed with which these new entities 
can be developed; the availability of efficient and difficult-to-regulate distribution 
systems via the internet; and perhaps Western society’s greater tolerance for altered 
states of consciousness.  The difference between a “good” high (alcohol in 
moderation) and a “bad” one (Ecstasy) is becoming harder to explicate. 
 
What is striking is just how modest and localized this problem has been so far.  
Though the EMCDDA notes that the number of substances on the early warning list, 
for which assessments are required, has risen in recent years and was 24 in 2009, 
almost double the 2008 figure (Europol and EMCDDA, 2010), most of those 
substances turn out to have created very little problem at the time that they enter 
the list4. Often the problem is almost exclusively in one European nation, as in the 
UK for mephedrone.   In the United States, where this problem is usually described 
colloquially as “designer drugs”, a term that flatters the producers (Kau, 2008), the 
number of new psychoactive substances is also very small.  Coulson and Caulkins 
(2011) identify just 73 new substances that have been subject to scheduling 
decisions since 1971 in the United States.  Intriguingly, the substances that have 
been most prominent in Europe have been essentially unknown in the United States.  
For example, a 2010 search of the long list of entities recorded in the Drug Abuse 
Warning Network5 found no mention of any of BZP, Spice6, mephedrone, and 
naphyrone, using both street and technical names. 
   
Unsurprisingly, the policy analytic literature on this topic is tiny.  The policy analysis 
that is available is focused on specific substances or else is very legal and 
bureaucratic in orientation. Winstock and Ramsey (2010) is a notable exception that 
contains a number of important observations about the regulatory dilemmas posed 
by these substances. 
 
This paper is intended to provide the basis for a discussion of policy options in 
dealing with new psychoactive substances that show signs of popularity and of 
harmfulness before they have been subject to full regulatory scrutiny under the 
domestic and international drug-specific regulations.  Are there options that 
effectively control the risk of widespread use of potentially dangerous substances 
without incurring the dangers of prohibition and accompanying black markets? 
 
                                                                                                                         
almost 60% to just 1.7%.  There have been no claims of enforcement success involving this 
particular drug. 
4At the end of 2009, the total number of substances reviewed since the system began in 
1997 was 97.  http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/situation/new-drugs-and-trends/2   
5 DAWN collects data from a sample of hospital Emergency Departments on drug-related 
admissions. 
6 Interestingly, Monitoring the Future asked about Salvia in just one year, 2008:  5.7% of 
high school seniors reported use in the previous twelve months.  This made it the fourth most 
popular drug for that age group. 
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There are essentially four main frameworks that are used to regulate the use and 
availability of substances that may be consumed by humans. These are, in ascending 
order of restrictedness: 
 
1. Foodstuffs regulations 
2. Regulations relating to specific commodities, such as tobacco and alcohol, but 
also substances with other uses, such as solvents. 
3. Medicines regulations 
4. The regulation of illicit substances covered by international conventions and 
related national and domestic legislation 
 
To date governments have largely limited their considerations to regulation of new 
substances under the illicit substances frameworks. The next section describes the 
current system of classifying psychoactive substances and how it deals with new 
substances in the UK, European Union and the United States.  That is followed by a 
review of how various countries responded to four specific new drugs that have 
received considerable attention: BZP, Spice, mephedrone and naphyrone.  That is 
then followed by a discussion of the relevant experiences with other regulatory 
approaches.  The final section offers an assessment of the current systems and the 
dilemmas faced by modern governments in dealing with this phenomenon. 
   
The paper’s principal substantive conclusion is that there is an inherent, perhaps 
inescapable, bias in the system towards prohibiting new substances about which little 
is known.  The negative consequences to decision makers of permitting on the 
market, in any way, a drug that later turns out to be dangerous are very high.  The 
negative consequences to decision makers of keeping off the market a drug that is in 
fact harmless, even if the resulting prohibition worsens the problems related to that 
drug, are minimal.  Innovative regulatory schemes do not have much promise of 
cutting this Gordian knot, unless the public can be persuaded to view the pleasures 
or other benefits from these substances as potential gains to society, which itself 
may be considered a questionable goal.   
 
2. CURRENT APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH NEW 
SUBSTANCES 
This problem, labeled as “legal highs”, has in recent years attracted considerable 
official attention and even more media coverage.  The regulatory system involves 
international, national and sub-national institutions and laws.  I describe here some 
aspects of the systems of the United Nations (WHO), the European Union, and two 
nations: the United Kingdom and the United States; other nations are mentioned as 
needed. 
 
Options for regulating new psychoactive drugs 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
The United Nations   
Two of the mainstays of the international drug control system, the 1961 Single 
Convention and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Drugs, provide for a process to 
add new drugs to the list of those that are subject to supervision.  An Expert 
Committee on Drug Dependence, consisting of international experts, is operated by 
the World Health Organization.  Once the Expert Committee has decided that a 
substance should be subject to scheduling, i.e. some degree of regulation, that 
recommendation is considered by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, a set of 43 
nations chosen by the UN Economic and Social Council.  Once approved by the CND, 
all Member States (essentially all nations) must adopt a scheduling decision at least 
as stringent as that.  The process is a slow one, the Expert Committee meeting only 
approximately every two years during the last decade, lasting for only 3-5 days and 
handling just a small number of substances at each meeting.   There is no 
counterpart to the emergency procedures that have been adopted by various 
national systems. 
The European Union (EU) 
The EU in 2005 promulgated Council Decision 2005/387/JHA7 which created a set of 
procedures for dealing with new psychoactive substances that threatened to become 
popular with large numbers of users and with potential serious consequences to 
individual users. The procedures are comprehensive, covering the whole process 
from detection through risk assessment to legal action.  They are central to this 
study, so I provide a relatively lengthy excerpt from the Decision: 
 
“For risk assessment the Decision had five elements: 
• An assessment of risks caused by use of, manufacture of, and traffic in a new 
substance, as well as the potential involvement of organised crime; 
• The risks to be assessed include health and social risks, as well as the 
consequences of possible control measures; 
• The assessment is based on the analysis of scientific data and law 
enforcement information, made available by, e.g. health, social and law 
enforcement sources (but not necessarily limited to these); 
• The assessment may or may not take into account the same factors which 
warrant the placing of a substance under international control; 
• The assessment may be done in accordance with a formalised (legally based) 
procedure and it may be carried out by a scientific or expert body.” (Hughes 
and Blidaru, 2009) 
 
                                           
7 The 2005 Council Decision succeeded an earlier program with a narrower scope: the  Joint 
Action on New Synthetic Drugs, that had been in operation since 1997. 
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A good depiction of the process indicating its procedural and bureaucratic complexity 
is provided in Figure 1, taken from Sedefov and Lopez (2009)..Many European 
institutions are involved and the process is time consuming. 
 
Figure 1. Representation of EU Council decision making 
(Source:  Sedefov and Lopez, 2009) 
 
 
 
These EU procedures point to the difficulty of an assessment soon after a substance 
has entered the market.  For example, the risk assessment criteria include potential 
organized crime involvement (criterion 1) but provide no guidance as to how this 
might be done. There are two problems in assessing organized crime involvement, 
mirrors of each other.  On the one hand, if the drug were made explicitly legal, 
organized crime might be replaced by legitimate manufacturers who were initially 
unwilling to produce and market a substance not yet dealt with in the formal 
regulatory system.   On the other hand, it is also possible that organized crime may 
enter once prohibition is enacted, since prohibition excludes the marginal operators 
who are willing to produce/distribute when the product’s status is ambiguous but not 
when it is clearly illegal.  Analytically it is extremely challenging to make projections 
of the effects of legalization, since they have not been done before for any drug.  It 
may in principle be possible to identify the factors (production process, users, 
intensity of enforcement etc.) most likely to lead to organized crime involvement and 
those that discourage legitimate manufacture during the period when the status is 
uncertain. However, for the foreseeable future this phenomenon is not susceptible to 
systematic analysis. 
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Another problem in implementing this approach is that the assessment of health risks 
is essentially impossible at the stage the decision is called for.  This is discussed in 
detail below. 
 
NATIONAL SYSTEMS 
Individual EU Member States have their own regulatory systems for dealing with 
emerging substances, as reviewed by Hughes and Blidaru (2009).  The basic model 
is to add substances to an existing list of those that can either not be marketed at all 
or which can only be sold under specific controls. There is variation in whether this 
requires legislative action or can be done by an executive agency. Some nations use 
a generic system for scheduling, whereby a group of related substances are banned8, 
rather than requiring that each of the substances be considered and listed 
separately.  Still other nations use an analogue system, which “addresses more 
general aspects of similarity in chemical structure to a ‘parent’ compound; this aspect 
might be supplemented by a requirement for similarity in pharmacological activity, 
attempting a more specific delineation of the analogue system’s sphere of control.” 
(Hughes and Blidaru, 2009, pp6-7).  Some nations allow for accelerated scheduling 
decisions, based on a declared emergency with respect to a specific drug. 
   
Few of the systems produce analytical reports9.  Apart from those provided by the 
UK Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, those reports that were available for 
review are of limited conceptual sophistication.  Consider for example Ireland, which 
has been active in the field.  It has published an analysis of regulatory options for 
head shops, which are prominent there.10  The assessment makes no mention of any 
potential adverse effects of prohibition.  It identifies the dangers of not regulating 
and the potential gross gains of the regulatory options.  The only negative aspects of 
regulation that are given any attention are the costs of operating the regulation.  It is 
naïve compared to, for example, environmental regulatory analysis, which requires 
much more careful balancing of costs and benefits of each option11.   
 
The United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom has a complex system of classifying drugs; it involves two 
separate scales: Classes and Schedules (Home Office, 2006).   The Classes (A, B and 
C) refer to substances that are subject to the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act (as 
modified).  The class reflects their relative harm and the maximum length of 
sentences for offenses of use and distribution involving the drug.  The five-part 
Schedule reflects the utility of the drug for medical purposes and the level of control 
that must accompany its distribution.  Schedule I is no allowed medical use (e.g. 
                                           
8“One such group-generic definition is by reference to precise compounds which are 
structurally derived from a specific psychoactive substance. In the UK case of R v Couzens 
and Frankel in 1992, it was specified that “the term ‘structurally derived from’ does not 
describe a process, but rather defines certain controlled drugs in terms of their molecular 
structure.” Hughes and Blidaru (2009; p.6) 
9 I thank Brendan Hughes of the EMCDDA for considerable help on this matter. 
10 : http://www.justice.ie/en/jelr/ria.pdf/files/ria.pdf 
11 See for example the discussion of risk assessment in British environmental regulation in 
Pollard (2001) 
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LSD, Ecstasy, cannabis).  Schedule II includes drugs such as heroin and morphine 
that have medical uses but are known to be very potent and dangerous; they are 
subject to tight controls in their legal distribution.  As can be seen from the fact that 
heroin in Schedule II is a Class A drug but cannabis in Schedule I has been either a 
Class B or C drug during the last decade, the two scales are distinct.  Note that in 
both the Schedule and Class scales no weight is given to the pleasure derived from 
the substance; only therapeutic utility can be considered a benefit. 
 
The Home Secretary is empowered to seek advice from the Advisory Council on the 
Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) before making a decision about whether and how to 
classify/schedule a new drug.  The ACMD is an independent body of professionals 
who do not work for the national government.  In contrast to many other European 
nations (e.g. the Netherlands) the UK does not have specific emergency procedures 
(EMCDDA, 2009b).  In recent instances the time from the Home Secretary’s request 
to delivery of an advisory letter seems to be 3 to 6 months. The Home Office 
recently announced plans for emergency scheduling of “legal highs,” although it is 
unlikely to come into effect until late 2011. 
 
The United States of America 
The United States has a highly structured process for the scheduling of drugs.  As 
described in the scheduling decision for BZP: “In accordance with 21 USC. 811(b) of 
the CSA [Controlled Substances Act], DEA has gathered and reviewed the available 
information regarding the pharmacology, chemistry, trafficking, actual abuse, pattern 
of abuse, and the relative potential for abuse of 2C-T-7, BZP, and TFMPP.” 12 There 
is a three-part test for Schedule I classification: 
 
“(1) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.  
(2) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in treatment 
in the United States.  
(3) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under 
medical supervision” 
 
The US does have an emergency procedure.  The Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) can issue an Interim ruling scheduling a drug for 12 months (with a potential 
for 6 months extension).  At the end of the period the DEA Administrator can only 
issue a final scheduling decision if the Secretary of HHS has completed an evaluation 
and recommends scheduling.  
 
Note that there is no reference to harms associated with the distribution, as in the 
European Union Directive.  The Drug Enforcement Administration, primarily a law 
enforcement agency, is in charge of the process but can consider only health-related 
consequences.  However it is required to consult with other relevant expert agencies 
in the federal government. It must also consider information provided by any party, 
public or private, once the decision process begins, as is true of regulatory rule 
making in the United States generally. 
                                           
12 http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/fed_regs/rules/2003/fr0908.htm 
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Central to the proceedings in the US has been the Federal Analog Act, enacted in 
1988, after a previous legislative effort had been struck down by the courts.  Until 
then the DEA had to promulgate a ruling for each chemical separately.  With the 
American regulatory and legal system’s extreme deference to due process, this took 
many months, sometimes years; Kay (2002) describes the four-year process needed 
to schedule Ecstasy.  Instead, the 1988 Act automatically prohibits a chemical if it is 
"substantially similar in structure" to an already-prohibited drug, and has a 
"substantially similar chemical effect" or is "represented to have such an effect." Only 
70 prosecutions have been brought under the Analog Act because its vagueness 
prevents prosecutors from being certain that it applies.  In every case the courts 
have found the litigated substance to be an analogue, indicating considerable 
deference to the government’s interpretation of the law.   
 
Though it is difficult to measure the phenomenon across nations in a consistent 
fashion, legal highs appears to be less of a problem in the US than in Western 
Europe.  It may be that the Federal Analog Act is an important deterrent factor.  Its 
vagueness, which can hamper prosecutors, may amplify the deterrent effect; 
underground distributors are also unsure whether they would be able to avoid being 
convicted under the Act. However, one should also note the relative severity of 
sentences in the United States; ten- to twenty-year federal sentences for drug supply 
convictions are common enough to give pause to a chemist with reasonable earnings 
opportunities in legal activities.  
 
3. THE EXPERIENCE WITH FOUR NEW DRUGS 
 
There have been surprisingly few instances in which a new psychoactive substance, 
not covered by existing regulations or laws, has become a significant problem.  Only 
four have received much attention in the United Kingdom so far, though the threat is 
continuous13: 
 
BZP (1-BENZYLPIPERAZINE)   
This drug, briefly available in Hungary as a registered anti-depressant14, came into 
the recreational market as a means of ending dependence on methamphetamine 
(Sheridan et al., 2007).  It became a widely used drug in New Zealand in the period 
2004-2008, after which time the New Zealand government prohibited it.  This is 
probably the richest and best-documented case of a government struggling with an 
array of choices for regulating a new drug that was popular but whose dangers were 
not yet well understood.15    
 
                                           
13For example, late in the writing of this report, the Economist (2010) reported great concern 
in Poland about the sudden emergence of a variety of new drugs, called “afterburners”. 
14 The tangled tale of BZP’s origins is presented in EMCDDA (2007; p.3) 
15 There is a relatively large descriptive literature on BZP in New Zealand.  See e.g. Gee et al., 
2005; Wilkins et al., 2006 and Sheridan et al., 2007 
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The substance first appeared in “party pills” in 2000.  The government’s initial 
regulatory efforts were not until 2005, when it was placed in a new schedule within 
the Misuse of Drugs Act as a “Restricted Substance”.  This scheduling prohibited sale 
to anyone under 18 and prohibited various promotional activities, which had 
previously been widespread; otherwise the substance was unregulated (Sheridan and 
Butler, 2010).  As reported by the New Zealand Law Commission’s (2010) review of 
drug policy, “BZP was the fourth most widely used drug in 2007/08. 5.6% of 
respondents had used BZP in the previous 12 months, while 13.5% had used BZP at 
some point in their lives.”  
  
There was an intensive review of the regulatory options by the New Zealand Expert 
Advisory Commission on Drugs (EACD)16 in 2006 and 2007 (EACD, 2006 & 2007). 
The EACD concluded that the risks to users from BZP were modest; the variability of 
potency of preparations being sold as BZP (without formal regulation) was amongst 
the most important sources of risk.  Acute problems were often the result of 
combining BZP with alcohol or other drugs.  The public health risks were also 
assessed as modest and there was emphasis on the dangers to the population 
resulting from its ambiguous legal status.  The population saw it as legal, whereas it 
was merely not prohibited.  In fact the products were not subject to formal 
regulation, only voluntary guidelines from an industry association which were not 
thought to be effective.  The Expert Advisory Committee concluded that, “While it is 
the EACD’s view that the research has now demonstrated that BZP does pose a 
moderate risk of harm, newer substances may be shown to pose a low risk of harm 
but still be worthy of restrictions. The Committee’s view is that the implementation of 
restrictions should place the burden of proof on the person supplying the substance 
to demonstrate the safety of a new psychoactive substance (EACD, 2007; p.7).  In 
April 2008 the New Zealand government moved to schedule the drug as Class 1 
under the Drugs Misuse Act of 1975; this amounted effectively to full prohibition.  
There was a six-month transition period in which purchase, possession and use were 
not yet prohibited.    
 
The drug, whose reported adverse effects include psychosis, renal toxicity, and 
seizures (Freye, 2009), has also been prohibited in a number of EU member states, 
Australia and the United States. The US action was much earlier than those of other 
nations.  Already in 2002 an emergency scheduling had taken place.  It reflected 
three deaths that had been identified as involving the simultaneous use of BZP and 
MDMA. Between 1996, when the drug had first appeared, and 2002, seizures had 
taken place in 21 states and the District of Columbia.  The underlying science was 
slender and not well interpreted by DEA, which relied on two studies from the 1970s 
comparing BZP to amphetamines.  
 
The EMCDDA and Europol committee report on how the European Commission 
should regulate the drug was explicit about the limited evidence available.  
 
                                           
16 The Committee membership includes both medical and law enforcement personnel.  The 
tone of the Committee reports is very much that of a medical or public health document, with 
careful attention to peer reviewed studies and an emphasis on evidence.    
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“There is an absence of standard safety pharmacology and toxicology data. 
Only a few direct studies have been made on the physiological properties of 
BZP in humans, and nothing has been published on the effects of BZP on 
specific organ systems. Much of the available information derives from 
indirect sources, either from studies of Trelibet®, from self-reports of users 
on Internet sites, from clinical observation of intoxicated patients or from 
post-mortem material. Many of these latter ‘case reports’ involve polydrug 
use and therefore suffer from problems of interpretation. Many BZP tablets 
and capsules also contain TFMPP (1-(3-trifluoromethylphenyl) piperazine). 
Furthermore, surveys in New Zealand have shown that most users consume 
BZP with alcohol as well as other psychoactive substances.” (EMCDDA, 2007; 
p.4)17 
 
The committee recommendations were thus appropriately very cautious.  There was 
no evidence that the drug was safe for human consumption but the risks seemed 
modest.  The committee did not firmly recommend control.  Instead it equivocated, 
emphasizing in its final sentence the weak evidence base: “Many of the questions 
posed by the lack of evidence on the health and social risks of BZP could be 
answered through relatively simple and inexpensive research. A strong conclusion of 
the Committee was that further studies are needed, especially in respect to potential 
neurotoxicity and social consequences.” (p.9)  The appropriate European body 
(European Council) in 2008 recommended that Member States put BZP on the list of 
controlled substances. 
 
The Home Office asked the ACMD to review BZP in 2008, after the EMCDDA report 
was published.  Already in 2007 the Medicines and Health Care Products Regulatory 
Agency (MHRA) had issued a press statement warning that sellers of BZP were 
potentially subject to prosecution18.  The ACMD’s task was simply to provide advice 
on the implementation of the European Council requirement that BZP be placed 
among controlled substances.  The brief ACMD report added little to the existing 
literature and focused on whether only BZP should be included, or whether it should 
be a broader class; it decided on the latter19. 
                                           
17The discussion of interaction with alcohol raises an important issue.  If, despite label 
warnings, it is predictable that users will take the two substances simultaneously, should that 
figure in the risk assessment?  
18 The agency stated that “There are piperazine containing medicines for human use which 
must be sold in pharmacies. Any other pills containing piperazine or its salts or derivatives 
would be classified as unlicensed as there are no safeguards in relation to the safety, quality 
or efficacy of the pills.” See http://www.mhra.gov.uk/NewsCentre/Pressreleases/CON2030603 
19 The class was defined as "1-benzylpiperazine and any compound structurally derived from 
1-benzylpiperazine or 1-phenylpiperazine by substitution in the aromatic ring to any extent 
with alkyl, alkoxy, alkylenedioxy, halide or haloalkyl substituents, whether or not substituted 
at the second nitrogen atom of the piperazine ring with alkyl, benzyl, haloalkyl, or phenyl 
substituents." (ACMD, 2008) 
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SPICE 
Spice is a set of herbs with some synthetic cannabinoids added.  The regulatory 
issues have been analyzed by the EU system (Griffiths et al., 2010; EMCDDA, 2009).  
Spice is poorly defined.  Its active ingredient could be any one of a large number of 
cannabinoids that are not regulated and about whose harms little is known.  Further 
complicating matters, it often does not contain the materials that are identified on 
the package. 
   
It has been very much an Internet phenomenon, where it is advertized for purposes 
other than consumption (e.g. incense).  “The United Kingdom noted that a Google 
search produced over 11 million hits for Spice Gold (higher than most of the 
commonly used illicit drugs)” (EMCDDA, 2009, p.14). 
 
It was first identified officially in Sweden in 2007, though it had been available at 
least since 2004.  There was an EMCDDA expert meeting early 2009, which surveyed 
Focal Points20 as to whether there was any evidence of Spice being available in their 
countries.  Among other indicators, the survey considered web sites advertizing 
either in the country or aimed at the country.  The drug was not available on sites in 
countries that had prohibited the drug.  Where it was available the price per dose 
was comparable to the price of cannabis per joint, approximately 3-4 euros. 
 
Though it was available from almost half of a sample of online shops that were 
surveyed, the reports from Member States showed a great deal of variation in 
availability.  For example, “the French Early Warning System suggested that the 
presumably target population for these drugs (mainly party goers) showed little 
interest in these types of products.” (EMCDDA, 2009, p.13) No mention was made of 
any organized crime involvement. 
   
The EMCDDA/Europol expert group was unable to reach a firm conclusion about any 
aspect of the substance: its harms, popularity or sources21.  Indeed, when written up 
for journal publication (Griffiths et al., 2010), the drug was offered as a case study in 
the problems presented by globalization and market innovation with an emphasis on 
complexity and uncertainty. 
 
The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs was willing to go further, though it did 
not conceal the highly speculative basis of its recommendation that the drug be 
classified under the Misuse of Drugs Act in the same schedule as cannabis. 
 
“Our report explains that the detailed pharmacology of these synthetic 
Compounds [in Spice] is, as yet, unknown. There are also a large number of 
                                           
20 Each Member State has a Focal Point responsible for provision of data to the EMCDDA. 
21 The EMCDDA has not issued an official report under the 2005 Council Decision .  A box on 
the first page states “This report is not an official EMCDDA publication, it is prepared to 
inform a specific group of recipients and is, therefore, not suitable for wider public 
dissemination. The report has no legal meaning under the terms of Council Decision 
2005/387/JHA. 
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potential cannabinoids that could be synthesised.  However, some inferences 
can be made based on the chemistry of the drugs identified to date and it is 
very likely that these synthetic cannabinoids will produce harmful effects 
similar to those associated with THC. Indeed, our report notes that the 
substances containing the synthetic cannabinoids have the potential to be 
more harmful than cannabis due to their method of manufacture and that the 
compounds present and their quantity (and hence potency) is unknown to 
the user. 
 
After consideration of the available evidence, the ACMD concludes that with 
respect to the classification of substances under the Misuse of Drugs Act, the 
harms of the synthetic cannabinoids are broadly commensurate with those of 
cannabis and that they should be classified accordingly.” (ACMD, 2009; pp.2-
3) 
 
In the United States, Spice has not received much attention and, as noted before, 
did not appear in the DAWN system of information from Emergency Departments 
and Medical Examiners as recently as 2010.  For example, in discussing major 
components of Spice, DEA refers to its occurrence in European recreational markets 
and not in the United States.22 The same document also mentions just an occasional 
seizure of a drug with that name. 
 
Nonetheless, on November 24, 2010, the DEA announced that it proposed “using its 
emergency scheduling authority to temporarily control five chemicals (JWH-018, 
JWH-073, JWH-200, CP-47,497, and cannabicyclohexanol) used to make ‘fake pot’ 
products…. Since 2009, DEA has received an increasing number of reports from 
poison centers, hospitals and law enforcement regarding these products.  Fifteen 
states have already taken action to control one or more of these chemicals” (DEA 
2010).  No information beyond the press release was provided.23 
 
MEPHEDRONE 
Mephedrone (4-methylmethcathinone) is a substituted cathinone (an ingredient of 
khat) commonly known as Miao/Meow or TopCat.  It is the most recent legal high to 
attract attention, particularly in the United Kingdom, which accounts for 88% of 
European seizures of the drug (EMCDDA, 2010).  Measham et al. (2010) argue that it 
has emerged in part as the consequence of problems in the Ecstasy market, where 
consumers have found it difficult to obtain product of consistent quality.  
Mephedrone provides Ecstasy-like effects, though also some stimulant effects more 
characteristic of amphetamine. 
                                           
22 CP 47,497 and homologues 2-[(1R,3S)-3-hydroxycyclohexyl]-5-(2-methyloctan-2-yl)phenol) 
[Purported Ingredient of 
"Spice"]http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugs_concern/spice/spice_cp47497.htm  
23  It is unclear that the ban, which was supposed to be in effect 30 days after the issue of 
the Notice had actually been put in place.  A troll of drug activist web sites turned up a 
number commenting that there had been no follow-through.  Whatever uncertainty existed 
was clarified by March 1, 2011, when a temporary order was issued: 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr030111.html  
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Once again knowledge of the adverse effects of the substance is slight, though in 
contrast to Spice it is well defined.  The 2010 report by the EMCDDA states: “There 
are no formal pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic studies on mephedrone. There 
are no published formal studies assessing the psychological or behavioural effects of 
mephedrone in humans. In addition, there are no animal studies on which to base an 
extrapolation of potential effects. Therefore psychological and behavioural effects 
related to mephedrone use are based on users’ reports and clinical reports of acute 
mephedrone toxicity.” (p.12)  The user reports used in the analysis derived from an 
on-line survey of subscribers to MixMag, a dance music magazine.  A wide variety of 
negative effects were reported and some by a large fraction of the users.   
 
A survey of EU Member States found that only the UK and the Netherlands had made 
substantial seizures; the nine others with any seizures reported totals of between 2 
and 325 grams. Eight other member states reported no seizures of mephedrone. 
   
The United States has yet to see any substantial sign of mephedrone, though in 
January 2011 there was reporting of a problem emerging in Mississippi (Byrd, 2011). 
One state, North Dakota, has scheduled the substance but an interview with an 
executive of the state agency responsible for the decision suggests just how little 
evidence is needed for such decisions at the state level. What follows are notes from 
Alexa Briscoe: 
 
“The Bismarck Tribune ran four stories on mephedrone around the time it 
was placed under Schedule I within the state, via an emergency ruling24. 
 
The agenda for the emergency scheduling meeting states: “The purpose of 
this rule is to schedule substances which have an actual or relative potential 
for abuse; and which bear risk to the public health by unknown individuals 
using them by inhaling the smoke, vapors or by ingesting or injecting the 
substances”; however, I have been unable to find any sort of study 
conducted by North Dakota to demonstrate such potential for abuse and 
health risks, or even any review of existing studies or cases. 
 
In response to an email, an official of the North Dakota Pharmacy Board said: 
‘We had a couple of teenage girls in the hospital here after injecting the "bath 
salts" intravenously, presumed to contain mephedrone. The news reports and 
general research into the drugs chemistry and effects were enough for the 
Board and the Attorney General. When the lab report came back it was 
actually 3,4-methylenedioxypyrovalerone (MDPV) so we scheduled that one, 
as well. 
 
                                           
24 For example, 2/24/10: “Legal highs” hit Bismarck 
(http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/article_79ac9362-21a5-
11df-8cf1-001cc4c002e0.html)
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We have not heard any good reasons why we should change the action, so 
they will stand and the legislature will get a chance to review the action in 
our 2011 session. 
 
If we had truth in labeling for Bath Salts, K-2 and Spice products, maybe 
protection of the public would not require the scheduling. It makes it pretty 
tough for the emergency room physicians to treat someone when they have 
no idea what the patient has used.’” 
 
NAPHYRONE/NRG-1  
Naphyrone is a high-potency cathinone; harms closely equate with those of 
mephedrone, but the standard dose of naphyrone is one-tenth as large.  It is sold in 
the UK largely through the internet.  The ACMD (2010) states that a majority of 
samples described as containing naphyrone actually contain mephedrone and other 
related compounds25.  Indeed the ACMD speculates that this may be the 
consequence of mephedrone distributors dumping their produce under a non-
prohibited label, now that mephedrone itself is listed under the Misuse of Drugs Act. 
   
Naphyrone has considerable abuse potential.  It is a triple-uptake inhibitor like 
cocaine (with ten times the potency) rather than a single-uptake inhibitor like d-
amphetamine and MDMA.  The lack of transparency regarding content could easily 
lead to overdoses given the relative strength of naphyrone26.  
  
The ACMD noted that “there have been no confirmed cases of acute toxicity 
associated with the use of naphyrone.” (pp.11-12)  Further: “The ACMD is not aware 
of any relationship between naphyrone and anti-social behaviour or acquisitive 
crime.” (p.13)  In recommending classifying it as a Class B drug, the ACMD 
emphasized that (1) drugs marketed under this name often contained other drugs 
(2) the differences in dose size between naphyrone and the drugs often sold under 
that name were large and (3) the effective dose size of naphyrone was so small (25 
mg.) that many users were likely to take dangerously high doses.  
 
David Nutt, former chair of the AMCD who was fired for his outspoken views, has 
been highly critical of the decision.  He notes the absence of evidence of either harm 
or popularity and argues that the decision can have adverse consequences for 
medical research, since it will inhibit exploration of a family of chemicals that might 
have value in the treatment of addiction (Nutt, 2010).   
 
The drug is not regulated in the United States at present.   
 
Figure 2, taken from Coulson and Caulkins (2011) shows how emerging substances 
have been scheduled in the UK, US and  Australia. As they note, there is a great deal 
                                           
25 The principal source of this claim is Brandt et al. (2010) which reports on just 24 purchases 
from 18 websites. 
26 That is an example of the importance of the social context of a drug.  The harm is not 
inherent in naphyrone but in how it fits into the historical development of psychoactive 
substances.  
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of overlap across the three countries.  Of the 38 substances on the list, 26 (two 
thirds) are scheduled in all three jurisdictions; only 5 are scheduled in just one 
jurisdiction.  There are in addition 38 substances that are scheduled not only in these 
three countries but also by Canada, New Zealand and the United Nations. 
 
Figure 2.  Venn Diagram Indicating which Emerging Substances Have Been 
Scheduled in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia27  
(Source: Coulson and Caulkins, 2011) 
 
4. LEARNING FROM OTHER REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
 
As noted in the Introduction, there are quite different models of regulatory decision 
making that might be considered appropriate for making decisions about these new 
drugs.  We consider two alternatives here: the system used for alcohol and tobacco 
in many nations and that used for food supplements in the United States 
 
ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO REGULATION  
Given the continuing interest in making comparisons between the harmfulness of the 
two principal legal drugs, alcohol and tobacco, and of those that are banned under 
the Drug Misuse Act, it has been suggested that the alcohol and tobacco regulatory 
                                           
27  38 substances that have been scheduled everywhere are not listed explicitly for sake of 
clarity. 
Options for regulating new psychoactive drugs 
 
systems could provide a useful model for comparison.  There is an international 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control but that is far less intrusive on individual 
nations’ policies than the conventions for psychoactive drugs.  There is no 
counterpart for international alcohol control.  Western countries have developed 
elaborate and highly intrusive regimes for these two products, governing both the 
nature of what can be sold and how it can be promoted.  Though many observers 
argue that the existing regulatory regimes are insufficiently stringent (see Cook, 
2007 for an assessment of alcohol control), in many countries they have been 
tightened in recent years.  In particular, restrictions on promotion and taxation of 
cigarettes are vastly tighter than were a generation ago. 
 
Yet as schemes for the assessment of new products, there seems little to be learned 
from either substance.  New alcohol or tobacco products may attract regulatory 
attention if they represent an exaggeration of existing forms, as for example when 
attention was drawn in the U.S. to drinks that contained caffeine as well alcohol; see 
the FDA notice banning certain products28.  However regulation has not had to deal 
systematically with the issue of distinctive new substances. 
 
REGULATING UNDER FOODS OR RELATED LEGISLATION  
Another alternative approach to regulating these new substances that make no 
therapeutic claim is to treat them not as drugs, for which the government has to 
make safety and efficacy determination before letting them on the market, but 
instead like other products where there is a presumption of safety which can be 
challenged when the government has gathered data indicating dangers.  This is a 
common approach to the regulation of food in Western countries. 
 
The experience with weight loss products in the United States offers a sobering 
lesson.  These products provide a particularly strong analogy because the producers 
provide a continuing string of apparently new products, making claims about them 
which are difficult to validate. 
 
The weight loss products are regulated by the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) 
but as foods rather than drugs; see GAO (2002) for a full description of the system.  
The presumption is that foods are safe until proven otherwise; the burden of proof is 
on the government to show that a product is unsafe rather than on the manufacturer 
to show that it is safe.  If a food or weight loss product is found to be unsafe or 
dangerous, then the FDA can require that the product be pulled from the market.  
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can, and does, regulate the advertizing for 
these products.  Most importantly, the producers may not claim the product cures 
any disease or illness. 
 
The market for these weight loss products in the United States is estimated to be 
about $2 billion per annum (Cawley, 2011).  Most of the products marketed are at 
best ineffective; some are harmful, a few extremely so.  The advertizing ranges from 
the inaccurate (“lose weight while you sleep”) to the ludicrous: “7 weeks ago I 
                                           
28http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm234109.htm 
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weighed 268 lbs, now I am down to just 148 lbs! During this time I didn’t change my 
eating habits at all: “This latter claim is equivalent to a daily deficit of over 8,000 
calories.  (FTC, 2002) 
 
The fact that these products are distributed in a legal market provides false 
reassurance about government regulation.  Approximately half of American believe 
that the weight loss products are approved for safety and efficacy before they can be 
sold to the public (Pillitteri et al., 2008).  The same ignorance held for young 
physicians: over a third of physicians in residency programs believed that these 
products needed to be approved by the FDA before they could be marketed. 
The FDA has difficulty obtaining information about adverse events involving these 
products (GAO, 2002) since the producers do not have an obligation similar to that of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to monitor post-market experience.  The GAO (2002) 
report described the problem in detail. 
 
“It is more difficult to study the safety and efficacy of multiple-ingredient 
products because each product may have a different combination of 
ingredients, meaning that each individual product would need to be studied. 
Further, the amounts of ingredients in a product may be unknown if the 
product contains a “proprietary blend” of various ingredients. Proprietary 
blends must list ingredients but are not required to specify the amount of any 
individual ingredient. Finally, it is harder to identify patterns in the adverse 
events associated with multiple-ingredient products and attribute the events 
to either an individual ingredient or a combination of ingredients. A study 
found that in 95 percent of the adverse events reported to FDA for products 
containing chromium, the products also contained as many as 11 additional 
ingredients, any of which may have been responsible for the adverse event. 
It is also possible that it is the interaction of these ingredients that is 
responsible for the adverse events.” (p.10) 
 
Efforts to restrict false advertizing are weakened by the lack of certainty as to the 
composition of any product.  The FDA and FTC regularly file suits against the 
manufacturers on safety grounds (the FDA) or false advertizing (the FTC).  State and 
local authorities also regularly file suits and occasionally obtain substantial awards 
against the manufacturers.  Nonetheless the problem continues, reflecting the fly-by-
night nature of many of the manufacturers; they move from one banned substance 
to another, with a different name both for the product and the manufacturer and 
many of the same ingredients. 
 
There are many ways in which the regulation of these weight loss products and their 
advertizing could be strengthened.  For example, the producers could be required to 
conduct post-market monitoring and to list all ingredients.  Nonetheless, there is little 
in the American experience with weight loss drugs to recommend this regulatory 
approach for new psychoactive drugs.  While it would prevent or delay the adverse 
consequences of prohibition for drugs that turn out not to be harmful, it allows those 
that truly are dangerous to linger in the market, with the apparent endorsement of 
the government, for a long period. 
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Table 1: Summary of main regulatory options available 
Type of Regulatory 
Framework 
Examples of Use Some issues/considerations 
Foodstuffs regulations 
(presumption of safety) 
  
  
Weight loss products 
Performance enhancement 
products 
• Rapid product turnover 
• Difficulty/cost of evaluating 
individual products 
• Presumption of approval by 
public 
• Allows too much exposure to 
dangerous products 
 
Regulation of specific 
commodities 
   
Alcohol regulation 
Tobacco regulation 
Solvents 
• No relevant examples of 
applicability to "legal highs" 
due to low product turnover. 
Medicines regulations 
(safety/efficacy must be 
proven) 
  
 • Slow to address new 
substances 
• Manufacturers/potential 
users advocate for approval 
• Production and ingredients 
tightly controlled 
• Only substances with proven 
medical use can be approved 
 
Regulation of illicit 
substances 
  
U.N. Conventions 
National laws 
• Slow to address new 
substances 
• Biased towards prohibition 
 
 
5. REGULATORY OPTIONS: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
What are the options for a government facing a new substance, about which not a 
lot is known but for which there are some indications both of potential harms to 
users and a growing popularity, whether for recreational or self-medication 
purposes? Table 1 and the four cases briefly summarized above point to the 
dilemmas of making decisions with limited information for which one outcome (a 
dangerous substance has not been prohibited) is far more salient than others.  They 
can be seen to illustrate the application of the precautionary principle, a major 
advance in thinking about the regulation of health and environmental hazards. 
 
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE  
The problem of choosing regulatory options for new psychoactive substances is, 
analytically, not unique.  It is simply another instance of the government being 
required to make regulatory decisions under uncertainty.  For this, in recent years, 
great attention has been given to the “precautionary principle”.  Though its 
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application in environmental policy decisions has been given much more emphasis, it 
is useful to examine its applicability to drug regulatory decisions. 
 
The definition of the principle that is most widely quoted is from the 1992 Rio 
Declaration, which states that: “where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific evidence shall not be used as reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental Degradation”.  It is, as stated 
there, a very modern principle.  Scientific knowledge is seen as an essential element 
for making policy decisions, in particular setting regulations.  Very often, indeed 
almost invariably, the scientific base for a decision is vulnerable to criticism, as can 
be seen by the frequency with which U.S. courts sustain challenges to regulatory 
decisions on the basis of weak evidence.  
  
In what circumstances can the precautionary principle be invoked?  The European 
Commission, implementing the Council’s adoption of the principle in its Resolution of 
April 13, 1999, states: 
 
The precautionary principle may be invoked where urgent measures are 
needed in the face of a possible danger to human, animal or plant health, or 
to protect the environment where scientific data do not permit a complete 
evaluation of the risk. It may not be used as a pretext for protectionist 
measures. This principle is applied mainly where there is a danger to public 
health. For example, it may be used to stop distribution or order withdrawal 
from the market of products likely to constitute a health hazard.29 
 
The phrasing could not be more appropriate to decision-making involving new drugs, 
about which the science is indeed uncertain and which pose a potential risk to public 
health. 
 
The precautionary principle is controversial even in its intended setting.  Cameron 
(2006) in an analysis of its applicability to environmental regulation suggests that it is 
a very narrow application of general risk management.  It is, in the simple form, only 
applicable when all parties are risk averse and the dangers large and irreversible.  
Implicitly, Cameron is arguing that it privileges just one element of the decision 
maker’s considerations.   
 
APPLYING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE TO DRUGS 
In political terms, the principle is seen as liberal, a way of defending active 
environmental regulation against a major source of attacks by corporations.  
However, in the context of drug-specific regulation, it is a conservative rule.  There 
is, with all the psychoactive substances considered so far, some evidence of dangers 
to users, if not to others.  The principle affirms that the state has an affirmative duty 
to protect individuals from such hazards; hence it appears to favour scheduling. 
Classifying a drug as falling under the Misuse of Drugs Act is tantamount to 
prohibiting its commerce, since at the time of the decision, it will not have been 
                                           
29 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/consumer_safety/l32042_en.htm  
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through sufficient testing to avoid being put into Schedule 1, “no recognized medical 
use”.  Indeed, these new substances are not presented as therapeutic drugs. 
 
However the complication here is that giving deference to those harms ignores the 
harms that arise from the decision to prohibit.  The ubiquitous David Nutt has 
presented an articulate attack on the application of the precautionary principle in two 
recent writings, briefly in Nutt (2010) and in more detail in a blog entry dated 23 
June, 201030.  He identifies eight specific harms from application of the precautionary 
principle.  For example he points out that some of the substances banned might turn 
out to be substitutes for alcohol that cause less harm than alcohol to the user and to 
others. Separately he points out that the principle inhibits the development of 
substances explicitly intended to substitute for alcohol since they would be subject to 
much tougher scrutiny than that drug.  His case is powerful. 
 
There is general recognition that the decision to prohibit a substance may be harm 
enhancing, at least in the gross sense; see for example New Zealand Law 
Commission (2010).  Prohibition means that those involved in the production and 
distribution are now at risk of arrest and various penalties.  That will inter alia affect 
who stays in the business.  Some entrepreneurs who are willing to participate in a 
marginal activity without clear legal status will be unwilling to undertake a clearly 
illegal activity.  That will leave a more risk-seeking and probably more violent group 
of entrepreneurs.  It will also affect the character of the organizations involved.  
Organized crime (referring to organizations that have more general criminal skills, 
including a capacity to corrupt and make credible threats of violence) may now 
become an important element of the production and/or distribution. 
 
However it is worth noting that large segments of the distribution and production of 
drugs are minimally affected by organized crime.  For example, much of the 
marijuana market is essentially social rather than criminal in its orientation, with 
friends providing each other; see Caulkins and Pacula (2006) for an analysis of 
survey data on the sources of marijuana for users in the United States. The Ecstasy 
market also has little connection to organized crime.  For Europe, Paoli and Reuter 
(2008) observe considerable differences across drugs in various aspects of their 
distribution, including the involvement of broader criminal groups. 
 
Even if organized criminals remain uninvolved, there are a variety of other harms 
following from prohibition.  Prohibition eliminates the possibility of providing quality 
control and assurance. Harms to individual users, on average, will rise as a 
consequence.  Another effect, which weighs heavily on regulatory agencies, is that it 
complicates the task of gathering data on the substance that would allow for a more 
informed decision, since there are no manufacturers with an incentive to collect and 
analyze such data; moreover it is believed that prohibition reduces the willingness of 
respondents in studies to disclose use.   
 
In making these decisions there is a pro forma argument for considering whether the 
new substance is substituting for a more dangerous prohibited one.  The New 
                                           
30
 http://profdavidnutt.wordpress.com/2010/06/ 
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Zealand data on BZP, whose use became very widespread before it was prohibited, 
provides the best evidence on this.  As summarized by the NZ Drug Foundation, 
there is some evidence that “legal” BZP was less a gateway to other, harder drugs 
than it was a cheaper and more accessible alternative to them.  The New Zealand 
Expert Advisory Committee on Drugs (EACD, 2006) noted that “Substitution of illicit 
drugs with piperazines is occurring, mostly amongst users who are afraid of the 
damage to their lives that a conviction would bring and who also wish to normalise 
the transaction required to purchase their choice of recreational substance.” (p.8) If 
that were true, then a comprehensive analysis of prohibiting BZP would have to 
include the potential for increase or decrease in the use of other, more dangerous 
drugs. 
 
This would require a highly speculative line of analysis.  The BZP data in New 
Zealand was exceptionally rich for a new substance precisely because the 
government had left it on the market for so long and it had become so popular; thus 
the potential for substitution was better understood.  But as Sheridan and Butler 
(2010) report, the apparent legality also encouraged users to take more than 
recommended doses; thus even if the drug was substituting for other more 
dangerous ones, it may have been taken in dose levels that reduced the health 
advantages implied.  More typically the government is required to make a decision 
(which could include postponing a decision) at a time when little data on drug 
substitution is available. The time it takes to gather convincing epidemiologic data is 
certainly years, perhaps even many years.  It would be a brave scientific committee 
indeed that would be willing to venture, on the basis of the limited data available, 
that the potential for substitution was high enough to make permitting of the drug, 
or at least delay in prohibiting, a sound decision.31  
 
A major concern expressed in the few major decisions to date has been the 
advertizing of the new substance, in particular on the internet.  This has allowed new 
substances to reach groups rich in potential consumers much more rapidly than in 
previous eras.  One strategic option is to slow the spread of the drug while gathering 
more information by regulating it under another regulatory regime, such as the one 
governing medicines, in which in the UK and most other Western countries, direct 
advertizing to users/patients can be prohibited.32  
 
However, as noted above, any kind of implicit legalization has unintended 
consequences.  A risk factor for users of illicit drugs is uncertainty about the contents 
of what they acquire.  The regulatory alternatives can require that packaging provide 
a full list of ingredients, thus reducing the risk of an unanticipated reaction.  
                                           
31 A similar issue has arisen in the context of decisions about the marketing of “safer” 
cigarettes.  A critical issue is whether these would result in more users, now relieved that the 
health consequences of smoking have been lowered.  An Institute of Medicine panel reckoned 
that it would take so long to learn about the effects on incidence that it was not proper policy 
to allow that experiment.  See Stratton, Shetty, Wallace and Bondurant (2001). 
32 This is probably not an option in the United States, where the courts have been highly 
protective of free speech for corporations, not even allowing states to prohibit roadside 
advertizing of alcohol. In this setting prohibition may be the only method for limiting 
promotion. 
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However, that reduced uncertainty may encourage taking larger quantities, as noted 
above in the discussion of BZP in New Zealand33  This argument runs the risk of 
cynicism.  The lack of quality assurance can also of course lead to deaths.  The 
above statements merely recognize that there are complex effects, some in the other 
direction. 
 
The problem has some symmetry with that facing drug regulatory agencies as to 
what criteria they should use in deciding whether to allow a therapeutic drug into the 
marketplace (Eichler et al., 2008).  The regulatory agency may be criticized for 
withholding the benefits for too long if the standards for assessing safety, efficacy 
and benefits are too stringent.  Stringency also raises the costs of bringing a drug to 
market and may thus discourage innovation.  Conversely, laxer standards will 
occasionally lead to marketing of drugs that are unsafe, ineffective or more costly 
than beneficial.  The trade-off is clear and there is no generalized right answer. 
  
The uncertainties surrounding assessment of risks related to medicines is worth 
emphasizing.  Consider Avandia, a widely prescribed anti-diabetes drug that aimed at 
reducing the risk of heart problems.  After 11 years on the market, evidence has 
accumulated that for some classes of patient, far from reducing the risks of 
cardiovascular events such as heart attack and stroke, the drug in fact raised them.  
In the fall of 2010 the European Medicines Agency recommended that Avandia be 
withdrawn from the market and the US Food and Drug Administration imposed new 
restrictions. “Avandia will be available to new patients only if they are unable to 
achieve glucose control on other medications and are unable to take Actos 
(pioglitazone), the only other drug in the class.”  The agency also required additional 
review of data from trials that had been ordered three years earlier by the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA), raising questions of integrity in the conduct of the trial.  
The EMA introduced new restrictions on the distribution of the drug.34   The fact that 
these decisions, even though drawing on large and elaborate clinical trials, are so 
often later reversed or at least viewed as questionable, indicates the difficulty of 
assessing the effects of drugs on humans.  
  
There is active discussion of developing new regulatory options as a way of dealing 
with the dilemma for new therapeutic drugs.  One such option is conditional or 
accelerated approval. Where there is great need for the drug, the regulatory agency 
may accept a higher risk level for early approval, at the same time requiring that the 
manufacturer continue to collect data that would allow, by a specified date, a full 
review. Another option is labeled “staggered approval”, whereby on the basis of 
limited data the agency authorizes use of the drug to a narrowly defined patient 
                                           
33 A recent BMJ editorial by Kings College addiction researchers (Winstock et al., 2010) 
argued that it should be possible to provide information about dangers to users without 
incurring the costs of prohibition.  It constitutes an optimistic read of the power of such 
information campaigns. 
34 For a recent statement on these actions see: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/LITIGATIONRESOURCECENTER/blogs/litigationblog/
archive/2010/09/23/avandia-off-market-in-europe-fda-to-restrict-its-use-orders-probe-of-gsk-
study.aspx  
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group with the greatest need.  As more data becomes available, the authorization 
can be expanded to more patient groups, defined by therapeutic need. 
Now compare the decision and setting for a psychoactive substance that has just 
recently emerged clandestinely from the thicket of chemists and distributors who 
operate at the margins of the legal psychoactive drug industry.  There are parallels in 
the structure of the decision and the consequences of errors. Prohibiting the drug 
hastily can create the problems associated with illegal markets unnecessarily as well 
as make it impossible to gather data for a more informed decision.  On the other 
hand prohibiting it too late may allow some drugs that are addictive and/or 
dangerous to the user to become widely used.   
 
The differences in the decision processes for therapeutic drugs and emerging 
psychoactive substances are more striking.  An important distinction is the setting of 
the decisions.  There is a well-financed and effective lobby for both sides of the 
regulatory decision debate for pharmaceuticals developed by pharmaceutical 
manufacturer.  The manufacturers are often very large corporations, anxious to 
recoup investments that may run to the hundreds of millions of dollars. The 
consumer side is often represented by well organized NGOs, provided with 
information from other government agencies that gather relevant data.  Egregious 
errors are likely to generate effective protest by the injured party.   
 
In contrast those who wish to prevent new backyard psychoactive drugs from being 
listed as prohibited drugs are marginal and poorly organized.  Because the drug is 
new, they will not be able to enlist a large number of users to protest denying access 
to what they might see as a harmless (or less harmful) pleasure.  Egregious errors 
on behalf of prohibition are unlikely to generate effective protest.   
 
The decision is weighted against approval in another sense, the most fundamental of 
all.  No weight is given to the benefits of the substance to the user.  At best the 
regulator might take into account that a substance is “less bad” than the alternatives.  
Thus the only benefits from not prohibiting the drug that are considered are precisely 
those, the benefits of not prohibiting.  There is nothing within the process that allows 
the fact that, if the drug was allowed to enter the market, perhaps many users would 
gain pleasure without adverse consequences, to be taken into account.   
 
6. WHAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN MAKING DECISIONS 
ABOUT PROHIBITION AND SCHEDULING? 
 
Caulkins and Coulson (2011) make a very important point when they note that there 
have been no major disasters (large numbers of deaths or serious injuries/infections 
on the one hand; large and violent illegal markets on the other) associated with new 
substances in recent years.  The system may be too cautious but it has apparently 
not made many errors on the other side, allowing dangerous drugs to be legally 
distributed.  The problem nonetheless remains potentially a serious one for 
developed nations. The growth of sophisticated chemical labs, legal and clandestine, 
in developing countries with minimal regulatory surveillance makes the future threat 
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look particularly troubling.  The hazards are amplified by the discovery of new uses 
of a growing array of existing substances. 
 
There is a history of critiques of the systems applied to regulating the distribution of 
psychoactive substances; for recent commentary see for example Kalant (2010), 
Nutt, King, Saulsbury and Blakemore. (2007) and Nutt, King and Phillips (2010) .  
The most common criticism is that the results of the system lack rationality; drugs 
that are very dangerous (most notably alcohol and cigarettes) are hardly regulated at 
all, whereas substances with fairly modest harms to individuals and societies are 
prohibited (Nutt, 2009).  The decision by Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2008 to 
schedule cannabis as a Class B rather than a Class C substance, before hearing from 
the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, only increased cynicism in Britain that 
the system reified social and political attitudes rather than resulting from scientific 
analysis. Twenty years earlier, a similar decision by the Administrator of DEA on 
keeping cannabis as Schedule I, overturning a well documented positive finding by 
an administrative law judge, had generated similar cynicism in the USA.35 
 
David Nutt and others have attempted to define the inherent risk of psychoactive 
substances as the basis for making regulatory decisions, including prohibition (Nutt 
et al. 2007). This however is only one factor that governments need to take into 
account, particularly with respect to prohibition.  For example, the likely adverse 
consequences of creating an illegal market is one possibly important characteristic 
omitted from the analysis (Nutt et al., 2007).  Some chemical entities, which can only 
be acquired by diversion from large scale and sophisticated pharmaceutical 
production system (e.g. methaqualone) may present much less of an enforcement 
problem than others that can be relatively easily be manufactured by low skilled 
workers in small batches, occasionally with substantial environmental hazards36.  The 
size of the existing user base is another factor that can affect the choice between 
prohibition and regulation.  Turning a large number of otherwise law abiding citizens, 
who are habitual users, into criminal offenders is not a decision to be taken lightly. 
 
The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD, 2010a) recently advanced a 
new and more sophisticated criterion using Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA), a 
well known tool for assisting decision makers in a variety of regulatory contexts.  It 
involves enumerating all the relevant harms and weighting them so as to take 
account of the perceived importance of each one.  The test model that the ACMD 
proposed, with many appropriate caveats, involved 16 different harms, nine borne by 
the user (e.g. increased risk of morbidity and of mortality) and seven by the rest of 
society (e.g. acquisitive crime or family breakdown).   See Nutt et al. (2010) for 
another application of this analytic approach.  
                                           
35 For the administrative law judge’s decision see 
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/young/index.html A defense of the 
current scheduling can be found at Basis for the Recommendation for Maintaining Marijuana 
in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act, 20037–20076, Department of Health and 
Human Services, Volume 66, Number 75, Federal Register, 18 April 2001. Retrieved on 2007-
04-28 
36 Small scale manufacture of methamphetamine in the US is known to have caused 
considerable danger to the workers and others in their households. 
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There are two limitations to the MCDA approach that are relevant for the legal highs 
issue.  The more fundamental is that the harms are assumed to be intrinsic to the 
drug rather than the result of the drug and its regulation.  That is clearly false.  For 
example, the mortality associated with heroin use is much lower if it is purchased in 
known quantity of specified purity from a pharmacy for injection with a sterile needle 
rather than purchased in a clandestine transaction with unknown adulterants to be 
injected with a used needle.  Obviously acquisitive crime is influenced by price, which 
will be much higher if the drug is prohibited. 
 
The second limitation, paucity of data, applies particularly to the legal highs.  Though 
the Advisory Council notes that information is likely to be incomplete, it does not 
confront the utility of the tool when there is almost no information.  For the new 
substances that constitute the category of legal highs, a fair description is that the 
tool requires almost complete guesswork for most entries.37 
 
Box A provides an expanded list of candidate harms that might be considered in 
making decisions about whether to allow a substance on the market.  A scan of that 
list suggests just how few of them involve information that is likely to be available at 
the time of regulatory decisions. 
 
Box A: A summary of factors relevant to making decisions about regulation 
of new drugs 
Harms from use 
        - To individual 
        - To society 
Inherent risk 
Prevalence 
Addictive potential 
Harms from markets 
Involvement of organized crime 
Harms and costs arising from prohibition 
e.g. criminalization of users 
     preventing potential substitution for more harmful substance 
     loss of potential for quality control / information provision 
Benefits to users 
        - Pleasure 
        - Medical 
        - Performance enhancement 
 
                                           
37 Caulkins and Coulson (2011) examine the availability of published research at the time that 
US scheduling decisions were made for 9 drugs.  In four cases there were fewer than 5 
published articles available..   
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7. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Among the few analysts that have written seriously on this issue of regulating new 
psychoactive drugs intended for recreational use, there is considerable unease with 
the existing system for making decisions about newly emerging psychoactive 
substances38; see Caulkins and Coulson (2011) on these critiques.  Many countries 
require that each substance be subject to its own extensive review, which is 
cumbersome when the flow of new substances with potential markets is threatening 
to turn into a flood.  Use of analog or generic systems rather than individual drug 
listings and introduction of accelerated procedures can reduce the burdensomeness 
and delay in making decisions but only in terms of increasing the ease of prohibition.   
 
However I believe that there are more fundamental concerns that the system is 
biased toward prohibition. This paper argues that the bias toward prohibition and 
scheduling is almost impossible to avoid. The adverse consequences of mistakenly 
refraining from prohibiting what may turn out to be a dangerous drug are massive 
both for the individual decision maker and for the political party in power at the time.  
On the other hand the gains from correctly allowing a new psychoactive substance to 
enter into the market, with appropriate regulatory controls, are modest and not very 
salient for the decision maker or the government.  A Type II error (allowing what 
should have been prohibited) has much greater consequences than avoiding a Type I 
error (prohibiting what should have been allowed).  That will be true even with a 
broader array of legal options. Once the decision not to prohibit is explicit, the 
decision maker faces a risk of significant public retribution. 
 
There has also been suggestion of moving to a completely different regulatory 
system, as suggested in the Introduction, one in which the government is not 
required to make a decision on prohibition as early as currently under the Misuse of 
Drugs Act or its equivalent in other nations.  I believe that even under a system such 
as that used for foods or medicines there will be the same bias, particularly since 
“not prohibited” is so easily misinterpretered as “permitted by the government”. 
 
The major task then is to develop a means to override this bias and to ensure a 
more balanced set of regulatory decisions.   That surely requires a change in 
attitudes of the public toward these substances.  Since the end of World War II, if 
not even earlier, Western societies have become increasingly tolerant of different 
ways of seeking pleasure, notwithstanding the occasional shift toward tighter 
controls, as has occurred in roughly the last decade in much of Western Europe.  
However this refers to phenomena that are well beyond the scope of any design of 
drug-specific regulation and to periods of time that are too long to be useful.  
Emphasizing substitution, that these substances may be less harmful than those that 
are already being used, whether legally or illegally, may be a more promising 
strategy for persuading the public that there can be gains from allowing regulation of 
risky new drugs.   
 
                                           
38 Obviously this discussion does not deal with new substances developed by pharmaceutical 
companies which will be submitted for regulator approval before being marketed. 
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Finally I return to the Caulkins and Coulson (2011) observation; the system has 
worked well in the sense that no major problem has emerged from a decision to 
allow into commerce a drug that turns out to be dangerous.  That is no small 
accomplishment.  The system may deny the populace some new pleasures and 
expand the harms of illegal markets.  These are more subtle and intangible gains but 
not necessarily minor; a less harmful substitute for alcohol would be worth a great 
deal.  However, the burden of proof for creating an alternative system is a heavy 
one.  A research effort to improve understanding of the substitution effects of new 
entities, as well as an examination of how prohibition of these entities creates market 
harms, would go a long way toward clarifying the issues. 
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